NAME

ipsec — IP security protocol

DESCRIPTION

ipsec is a security protocol in Internet Protocol (IP) layer. ipsec is defined for both IPv4 and IPv6 (inet(4) and inet6(4)). ipsec consists of two sub-protocols:

Encapsulated Security Payload (ESP): protects IP payload from wire-tapping (interception) by encrypting it with secret key cryptography algorithms.
Authentication Header (AH): guarantees integrity of IP packet and protects it from intermediate alteration or impersonation, by attaching cryptographic checksum computed by one-way hash functions.

ipsec has two operation modes:

Transport mode: is for protecting peer-to-peer communication between end nodes.
Tunnel mode: includes IP-in-IP encapsulation operation and is designed for security gateways, as in Virtual Private Network (VPN) configurations.

Since version 6, NetBSD uses the IPSEC implementation formerly known as FAST_IPSEC. Its specifics and kernel options are describes in the fast_ipsec(4) manual page.

Kernel interface

ipsec is controlled by key management engine and policy engine, in the operating system kernel.

Key management engine can be accessed from the userland by using PF_KEY sockets. The PF_KEY socket API is defined in RFC2367.

Policy engine can be controlled by extended part of PF_KEY API, setsockopt(2) operations, and sysctl(3) interface. The kernel implements extended version of PF_KEY interface, and allows you to define IPsec policy like per-packet filters. setsockopt(2) interface is used to define per-socket behavior, and sysctl(3) interface is used to define host-wide default behavior.

The kernel code does not implement dynamic encryption key exchange protocol like IKE (Internet Key Exchange). That should be implemented as userland programs (usually as daemons), by using the above described APIs.

Policy management

The kernel implements experimental policy management code. You can manage the IPsec policy in two ways. One is to configure per-socket policy using setsockopt(2). The other is to configure kernel packet filter-based policy using PF_KEY interface, via setkey(8). In both cases, IPsec policy must be specified with syntax described in ipsec_set_policy(3).

With setsockopt(2), you can define IPsec policy in per-socket basis. You can enforce particular IPsec policy onto packets that go through particular socket.

With setkey(8) you can define IPsec policy against packets, using sort of packet filtering rule. Refer to setkey(8) on how to use it.

In the latter case, “default” policy is allowed for use with setkey(8). By configuring policy to default, you can refer system-wide sysctl(8) variable for default settings. The following variables are available. 1 means “use”, and 2 means “require” in the syntax.

Name	Type	Changeable
net.inet.ipsec.esp_trans_deflev	integer	yes
net.inet.ipsec.esp_net_deflev	integer	yes
net.inet.ipsec.ah_trans_deflev	integer	yes
net.inet.ipsec.ah_net_deflev	integer	yes
net.inet6.ipsec6.esp_trans_deflev	integer	yes
net.inet6.ipsec6.esp_net_deflev	integer	yes
net.inet6.ipsec6.ah_trans_deflev	integer	yes
net.inet6.ipsec6.ah_net_deflev	integer	yes

If kernel finds no matching policy system wide default value is applied. System wide default is specified by the following sysctl(8) variables. 0 means “discard” which asks the kernel to drop the packet. 1 means “none”.

Name	Type	Changeable
net.inet.ipsec.def_policy	integer	yes
net.inet6.ipsec6.def_policy	integer	yes

Miscellaneous sysctl variables

The following variables are accessible via sysctl(8), for tweaking kernel IPsec behavior:

Name	Type	Changeable
net.inet.ipsec.ah_cleartos	integer	yes
net.inet.ipsec.ah_offsetmask	integer	yes
net.inet.ipsec.dfbit	integer	yes
net.inet.ipsec.ecn	integer	yes
net.inet.ipsec.debug	integer	yes
net.inet6.ipsec6.ecn	integer	yes
net.inet6.ipsec6.debug	integer	yes

The variables are interpreted as follows:

Variables under net.inet6.ipsec6 tree has similar meaning as the net.inet.ipsec counterpart.

PROTOCOLS

The ipsec protocol works like plug-in to inet(4) and inet6(4) protocols. Therefore, ipsec supports most of the protocols defined upon those IP-layer protocols. Some of the protocols, like icmp(4) or icmp6(4), may behave differently with ipsec. This is because ipsec can prevent icmp(4) or icmp6(4) routines from looking into IP payload.

STANDARDS

Daniel L. McDonald, Craig Metz, and Bao G. Phan, PF_KEY Key Management API, Version 2, RFC, 2367.

BUGS

The IPsec support is subject to change as the IPsec protocols develop.

There is no single standard for policy engine API, so the policy engine API described herein is just for the version introduced by KAME.

AH and tunnel mode encapsulation may not work as you might expect. If you configure inbound “require” policy against AH tunnel or any IPsec encapsulating policy with AH (like “esp/tunnel/A-B/use ah/transport/A-B/require”), tunneled packets will be rejected. This is because we enforce policy check on inner packet on reception, and AH authenticates encapsulating (outer) packet, not the encapsulated (inner) packet (so for the receiving kernel there's no sign of authenticity). The issue will be solved when we revamp our policy engine to keep all the packet decapsulation history.

Under certain condition, truncated result may be raised from the kernel against SADB_DUMP and SADB_SPDDUMP operation on PF_KEY socket. This occurs if there are too many database entries in the kernel and socket buffer for the PF_KEY socket is insufficient. If you manipulate many IPsec key/policy database entries, increase the size of socket buffer or use sysctl(8) interface.

Manual browser: ipsec(4)